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Abstract 
 
In this paper, we try to analyze the possible reasons behind food price hike. The 
motivation of doing this project is to see the probable reasons, which impact “common 
people” of India to the utmost extent. We concentrate mainly on the supply side, 
distribution aspects and the demand side. Checking these aspects we try to see their 
sensitivity in food prices.  
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Introduction 
 
 
One of the reasons identified for the present inflationary situation in India has been the 
high food prices. From October 2009 to March 2010 the year-on-year food-price inflation 
announced every week hovered around 20%. It has declined since then, though it still 
remains above comfort level. The high food price inflation is having a significant impact 
on the Indian consumer in general and the Indian middle class in particular. The chart 
below gives the way the Indians spend.  
 
Figure 1 
 
As evident from the chart above, nearly 43% of the personal disposable income goes into 
food products. Unfortunately, this is the segment, which is experiencing highest inflation. 
High food inflation ensures that consumers have to cut back on their spending (on non-
necessary items). This in turn will impact the consumption part of the GDP growth. Also, 
the high prices of food have become a top issue in a country like India where nearly half 
the one point two billion people are poor and spend a large chunk of their meager 
earnings on food. How will the poor cope with high food inflation? Even going by the 
Planning Commission figures, there are over 300 million people living in abject poverty. 
According to it, there are less poor today than three years ago and poverty is supposed to 
have come down from 37 per cent to 32 per cent in 2009-2010. But there are many more 
millions who are just "above the poverty line" and are still miserably poor. Persistent 
double-digit food inflation for 20 months till March this year is estimated to have pushed 
around 50 million people into extreme poverty, based on the $1.25 a day poverty line. An 
Asian Development Bank (ADB) report, “Global Food Price Inflation and Developing 
Asia” has estimated the impact of an annual 10 per cent increase in food prices on 
poverty numbers at an additional 22.82 million in rural India and 6.68 million in urban 
India. The numbers swell to 45.64 million and 13.36 million in rural and urban India, 
respectively, in the case of an annual food price inflation of 20 per cent. For Asia as a 
whole, home to 3.3 billion people, ADB estimated that an additional 64 million people 
could be pushed below the poverty line as a direct impact of double-digit food inflation. 
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Of these, 29.5 million would be in India. Between June 2009 and March 2011, India has 
suffered from 20 months of double-digit food inflation with the price rise shooting up by 
over 20 per cent in at least two months – December 2009 and February 2010. Indian 
families on an average spent 57 per cent of their incomes on food, with the poorest of 
them spending as much as 62 per cent. The ADB report said soaring food prices 
undermined the recent gains in poverty reduction in Asia. In August 2008 the World 
Bank estimated that India had 42 per cent of its population – 456 million – under the 
internationally benchmarked $1.25 a day poverty line in 2005. Estimates made by the 
Tendulkar for the same year was at 37.2 per cent of India’s total population, or 372 
million. Tendulkar estimated the incidence of rural poverty at 41.8 per cent and urban 
poverty at 25.7 per cent. In absolute terms, however, there were more poor people at 384 
million in 2009, up from 372 million in 2005. Inflation in food products has driven 
overall inflation. 
 
WPI Inflation (year-on-year) 
 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10 
All Commodities 6.51 4.82 8.03 3.57 
Food 7.99 5.97 9.07 14.52 
 
Source: Office of the Economic Adviser, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, GoI 
Table-1 
 
As per the latest data, overall WPI Inflation stood at 8.4% in December 2010. In the week 
ending 22nd January 2011, food inflation stood at 17.05%.  
In this paper, we try to analyze what the main reasons are underlying food inflation in 
India leading to wretchedness of the Indians in recent years, especially of the ‘Aam 
Aadmi’.   
  
 
Food-grain prices or non food-grain prices? 
 
Some economists argue that, it is the increasing price of the non food grains that drives 
the overall food price hike. But if we look at the following table below, we find that: 
  
 
Table 2: Rate of increase in prices of different food items according to wholesale 
price index: 
 
Years Rate of increase 
in prices of food 
items. 
Price of 
food 
grains 
Price of 
fruits 
Price of 
milk 
Prices of meat, 
fish, egg 
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Oct’09 
 
Nov’09 
 
Dec’09 
 
Jan’10 
 
Feb’10 
 
March’10 
 
April’10 
 
 
12.99 
 
18.66 
 
20.04 
 
18.41 
 
18.11 
 
16.65 
 
16.87 
14.75 
 
18.99 
 
20.16 
 
19.32 
 
15.25 
 
13.46 
 
11.93 
5.9 
 
10.19 
 
10.6 
 
7.61 
 
18.02 
 
12.02 
 
13.69 
10.03 
 
13.74 
 
13.36 
 
13.99 
 
14.82 
 
17.64 
 
21.95 
23.37 
 
30.11 
 
27.68 
 
31.01 
 
30.63 
 
31.00 
 
32.24 
 
Source: CMIE 
 
 
From this table, it is clearly visible that, the rate of change in food prices is directly 
reflected by the change in food grain prices. This is because while calculating the FPI, 
more weights are assigned to the main food grain items and less weight on non food grain 
items. This is done as for a LDC like India 75% of the population constitutes the poor or 
the “common man” whose basic food items consists of the food grains only. So, the food 
grain prices as the main determinant of the rising price of food items. Therefore, in this 
paper, we concentrate mainly on rising prices of food grains. 
 
 
International versus domestic food prices 
 
Global food prices have been on an upward trend for a fairly long time, particularly since 
2005. Prices accelerated starting in January 2007. Based on the Food and Agriculture 
Organization’s (FAO) World Food Price Index, international food prices in April 2008 
were 60% higher than 12 months earlier. World food prices have in particular been 
driven by higher grain prices. Two staple food grain of special importance to South Asia 
are wheat and rice.  
The international price of wheat more than tripled between 2002 and March 2008. The 
wheat price was relatively stable until 2006, but surged in 2007 and early 2008, reaching 
a global peak in March 2008. The price has since then come down, but as of August 2008 
it remained 70% higher than the average price in 2006. The price of rice increased nearly 
five-fold between 2002 and May 2008, when it reached a global peak. Rice price started 
rising since 2004, but the spike came in 2008 when the price more than doubled in five 
months between January and May. Rice price has also come down after May. 
          Rise in food prices in India was not far removed from the global pattern. Sharp 
increases in domestic prices were recorded in the year 2006-07, according to the 
Economic Survey 2006-07; primary articles recorded an inflation rate of 9.76 per cent in 
the year ending 2007 and contributed 34.87 per cent to overall inflation. Commodity-wise 
analyses of inflation in primary products revealed that in cereals and pulses sub-groups, 
eight commodities urad, moong, gram, wheat, maize, ragi, jowar and arhar had inflation 
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in excess of 5 per cent. Duty-free import of wheat and pulses to ameliorate the shortfall in 
domestic output relative to domestic demand had limited impact on domestic prices 
because of firm international prices.     
 
Table 3: Global versus domestic food prices 
 
Period FAO Food Indices Food WPI Indices 
2005-2008 83.76 19.72 
2007-2008 51.41 5.54 
March 2008 to May 2008 -2.27 3.74 
Source: FAOSTAT and Ministry of Industry, GOI. 
 
Even so, as of August 2008, international rice price was 128% higher than the average in 
2006. These large increases in global prices of food grains have huge adverse 
implications for rise in domestic price of food grains. As compared to the year 2005, food 
indices have nearly doubled in recent months (Jul 2008). Disaggregated level analysis 
indicated that the biggest contributor to this rise in prices were cereals followed by the oil 
and fats then dairy, sugar and meat. 
 
 
Adverse Effects of Trade Policy Bans: 
 
The introduction of export restrictions and bans (such as those imposed by India and 
China on rice) has further restricted global supply and aggravated shortages. India’s 
decision to ban rice exports (except for ‘Basmati’ rice) was quickly followed by export 
restrictions placed by Vietnam and other major players, with an immediate impact on 
prices. 
 
 
 
 
 
Classification 
 
Now we empirically discuss to what extend it creates an impact on price hike. To discuss 
it we divide our topic into two aspects 1) SUPPLY SIDE and 2) DEMAND SIDE 
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First let us concentrate on Supply Side viz. Production Aspect. 
 
 
SUPPLY SIDE – PRODUCTION ASPECT: 
 
1. Public investment 
 
Table 5: 
Year Public 
investment 
Private 
investment 
Total 
investment 
Share of 
public 
investment 
Share of 
private 
investment 
FPI(2
004-
2005=
100)* 
2004-
2005 
16183 62665 78848 20.5 79.5 100 
2005-
2006 
19909 73211 93121 21.4 78.6 103.06 
2006-
2007 
22978 71422 94400 24.3 75.7 111.54 
2007-
2008 
23039 86967 110006 20.9 79.1 152.64 
2008-
2009 
24452 114145 138597 17.6 82.4 155.75 
                                                                                                                       *calculated  
                                                                          Source: Economic Survey, 2010 
 
 
The most striking transformation occurring in Indian agriculture is the shift from a food 
grain-oriented supply-led framework dominated by the public sector, to a more 
Reasons behind food 
price hike 
Supply side Demand side 
Production aspect Distribution aspect 
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diversified and demand driven framework with an expanding role for the private sector. 
Indian farm output has been diversifying away from cereals and towards high-value crop 
and livestock products since the early 1990s and growth in high-value products has 
significantly outpaced that of cereals. The expansion of high-value crop and livestock 
agriculture has been led primarily by growth in consumer demand and changing 
preferences associated with rising incomes, urbanization and youthful demographics. 
This diversification of agricultural production offers the primary opportunity to 
strengthen lagging growth in farm output and rural employment. 
 
However, level of investment must be increased to achieve diversified growth with 
equity. To ensure that the transformation to higher-value agriculture is inclusive of 
India’s large number of marginal and small farmers, a large share of public investment is 
much needed in total agricultural investment. However, it is evident from the above data 
that the share of public investment compared to that of private investment is declining 
(from 2006-07 to 2007-08 & from 2007-08 to 2008-09). Instead of increase in public 
investment in absolute terms throughout the years, the increase in private investment 
overshadowed the effect of public investment due to its (private) larger shares. Due to 
inadequate public investment, irrigation and storage facilities as well as power and 
transport infrastructure are in a poor condition and only big farmers can get access to 
produce high-yield crops. Therefore, low level of public investment (in terms of declining 
shares) is one of the possible reasons behind price hike of food grains. This hypothesis 
partly get supported by the moderately negative (-0.45) value of the correlation 
coefficient between FPI (Food Price Index) and share of public investment. 
 
Low level of public investment results in inadequate irrigation facility. As a consequence, 
small and marginal farmers have to depend on monsoon for harvesting. Therefore, in our 
analysis, ‘effect of monsoon’ appears as a sub-point of ‘public investment’.  
 
 
 
Effect of monsoon: 
 
The Indian Meteorological Department’s monsoon forecast has become an annual media 
topic. In an agricultural based country like India, kharif crop is the main monsoon-
dependent crop. Due to insufficient rain in the year from 2003 to 2005, there arises 
shortfall in the production of kharif crops (though sufficient rain in the year 2006-2007 
led to rise in production in that financial year; but was not sufficient at all to improve the 
worst condition). For this reason, availability of food grains in the market has been 
declined over the years. So, by the simple market mechanism, the prices of food grains 
should increase. We can show this by using a graph. 
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Chart 1: 
                                             
 
        
More than 73% of annual rainfall in India is received during the South-West monsoon 
season. As a result, areas affected by low rains need to wait till the next monsoon. 
Reservoir levels are also largely dependent on South-West season rainfall. The problem 
is that, public investment in irrigation facilities is not directed towards these kharif crops. 
So, in spite of the existence of micro irrigation facilities, it primarily caters to irrigated 
areas (for horticultural / cash crops), where the impact of rain deficiency is less severe. 
This is evident from the following figure: 
 
                                               Chart 2: 
 
      
        Source: Edelweiss research, Indiastat, IMD 
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2. Gross cropped area of foodgrains and changing grain orientation: 
 
In the post independence period until 1967-68, much of the increase in food production 
had taken place from expansion of farm areas. The area expansion slowed down by 1970; 
and since then, the total net area sown for crops has not increased much. Most of the 
increase in gross sown area, however, has been achieved from increasing cropping 
intensity, mainly driven by the development of irrigation. 
 
  Rice Wheat Coarse Cereals Pulses 
Total food 
grains Growth Rate 
1950-51 20.58 6.46 15.38 8.41 50.82 - 
1960-61 34.58 11 23.74 12.7 82.02 4.90 
1970-71 42.22 23.83 30.55 11.82 108.43 2.83 
1980-81 53.63 36.31 29.02 10.63 129.59 1.80 
1990-91 74.29 55.14 32.7 14.26 176.39 3.13 
2000-01 84.98 69.68 31.08 11.07 196.81 1.10 
Table 6: Production of food grains; Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Government of 
India. 
Figure 2.1 illustrates the gross and net sown area, with the difference signifying the 
cropping intensity. From the beginning of the last decade we observe high difference in 
net and gross sown area, highlighting the growing cropping intensity. Table 2.2 shows the 
cropping intensity, irrigation intensity and the rainfed intensity. In 2000 we observe a 
decline in cropping intensity in both irrigated and rainfed area, and if we exclude that 
year we find considerable growth in the rainfed intensity. This is largely due to 
governmental policies directed towards improving the position of small farmers in the 
non-irrigated areas through extending the productivity revolution and production of high 
valued crops. 
However, cropping intensity growth in the irrigated area is still higher than that of the 
rain fed area. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.2: Cropping , irrigation and rainfed intensity of India during 1990-2000; Source: 
Ministry of Agriculture, Government of India. 
 
The growth in irrigation intensity is mainly contributed by groundwater expansion 
and increasing level of mechanization, while rainfall and the need to sustain livelihood 
 
Irrigation 
intensity 
Cropping 
intensity 
Rainfed 
intensity 
1990 1.31 1.30 1.29 
1991 1.32 1.29 1.27 
1992 1.33 1.30 1.29 
1993 1.33 1.31 1.30 
1994 1.33 1.32 1.31 
1995 1.34 1.32 1.31 
1996 1.33 1.33 1.33 
1997 1.33 1.34 1.35 
1998 1.32 1.35 1.37 
1999 1.37 1.35 1.33 
2000 1.35 1.32 1.30 
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determine the growth of intensity in the rainfed area, where majority of the rural poor 
people live. Most of the diversified and mixed farming are taking place in the rainfed part 
of the cropped area, and it contributes in increasing the cropping intensity.  
We analyze the state wise variation in cropping intensity across states in the last 
decade. Many climatic factors like rainfall, drought affects cropping intensity. So, we 
have taken a four-year average for the period 1990-1993 and 1997-2000.Table 2.1 shows 
the average cropping intensity and the corresponding growth rate. We observe high 
growth of cropping intensity in the northern and eastern states, and mainly in Uttar 
Pradesh and West Bengal. In the latter two states, intensity is driven by higher irrigation 
expansion. In Tamil Nadu, however, there is decrease in cropping intensity. In Tamil 
Nadu, depletion of groundwater resource increases the opportunity cost of increasing the 
intensive margin, and resulting a decrease in cropping intensity. 
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Figure 2.1: Gross and net sown area of India during 1950-2000; Source: Ministry of 
Agriculture, Government of India. 
 
States 1990-1993   1997-2000   
Growth Rates (Per 
Cent 1997-2000 over 
1990-1993) 
      
Haryana 1.58 1.72 8.81 
Punjab 1.79 1.90 5.84 
Himachal Pradesh 1.71 1.74 1.78 
Uttar Pradesh 1.33 1.51 13.81 
North Zone 1.45  1.61  11.12 
West Bengal 1.37 1.71 24.52 
Bihar- 1.29 1.35 4.61 
Orissa 1.33 1.39 4.29 
Assam 1.31 1.47 12.77 
East Zone 1.35  1.47  8.67 
Karnataka 1.14 1.17 2.51 
Kerala 1.29 1.33 2.92 
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Tamil Nadu 1.26 1.18 -5.83 
Andhra Pradesh 1.22 1.23 1.12 
South Zone 1.20  1.21  0.46 
Gujarat 1.12 1.12 0.46 
Maharashtra 1.17 1.24 6.08 
MP 1.20 1.28 6.99 
Rajasthan 1.24 1.27 3.16 
West Zone 1.19  1.25 4.79 
INDIA 1.30  1.34 3.16 
All major states 1.26  1.34  6.07 
 
Table 6: Cropping intensity in India during 1990-1993 and 1997-2000. Source: Ministry 
of Agriculture, Government of India. 
 
 
 
Changing grain orientation 
 
 
With technologies developments in agriculture and rising demand of non-food-
grain, traditional farming is changing into modern commercial farming. In case of India, 
prior to Globalization, there is a huge demand for cash crops, like tea, coffee, jute, etc. in 
the export market. It creates incentive for the domestic farmers to switch from food grain 
production to the production of cash crops. Also, both in India and outside, from the point 
of view of consumers, income-elasticity is much higher for the non food grains compared 
to that of food grains; with the increase in per capita income of the economy, preference 
pattern of the consumers is shifting from food grains to non food grains, like meat, fish, 
egg, milk etc. So, to meet this demand, farmers are using more and more area for non 
food grains production. . Between 1990-91 and 2000-01, around 4 percent of the gross 
cultivated area (GCA) - representing approximately about 6.7 million hectares (m/ha) - 
has shifted from food-grain crops to non-food-grain crops. Among the food grain crops, 
the area under superior cereals, i.e., rice and wheat, is increasing; while that of coarse 
cereals (millets) is on decline.  
While cereals and pulses have lost area, the major gainers of this area shift are the 
non food grain crops especially oilseeds. If we look at the grain orientation of agriculture 
defined as a ratio of gross cropped area for food-grain to total cropped area, we observe a 
declining trend. Grain orientation of agriculture during the last decade has decreased 
from 71% to 67%. Most of the change in grain orientation, however, is taking place under 
rain-fed conditions to reduce the risk factor of crop failures due to drought or less rain. 
This is also evident from chart 2.1.    
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Although comparative advantage, yield difference and crop rotation 
considerations often favour diversification in irrigated areas. 
 
Grain area - % of Total crop area 
50% 
55% 
60% 
65% 
70% 
75% 
80% 
85% 
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 
  
Total grain area - % of Gross Sown 
Area Irri. Grain Area - % of Gros Irri. 
Area RF grai area - % of Gross RF 
Area  
Chart 2.1: Grain orientation in irrigated and rain-fed area from 1960 onwards. Source: 
Ministry of Agriculture, Government of India. 
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Figure 2.1: Composition of foodgrains in India from 1950-2000. Source: Ministry of 
Agriculture, Government of India. 
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Figure 2.2: Trend in gross sown area of foodgrains in India from 1966-2000. Source: 
Ministry of Agriculture, Government of India. 
 
 
Table 6 shows the grain orientation of 16 major states and the growth from the 
period 1990-1993 to 1997-2000. The table suggests changes in grain orientation are 
taking place in most of the major states and with greater prominence in the rain fed area. 
Area wise change in grain orientation is more among the southern states. In the rice 
wheat producing states of Punjab, Haryana and Uttar Pradesh, diversification is taking 
place slowly in irrigated area. Much of diversification in Punjab is taking place in the 
rain-fed area. The minimum support price provided to farmers in the northern agricultural 
states act as risk reducing insurance against fluctuation in price. Farmers have little 
incentive to change to other high valued crops. Considering the rice dominant states, we 
observe a decline in grain orientation in West Bengal. Among the southern states, crop 
diversification is taking place only under irrigated conditions during the period 1997-
2000 in Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu. One of the reasons of change in grain 
orientation in Tamil Nadu especially is rapidly decline in groundwater level, caused by 
higher withdrawal rate than the recharge rate. It induces farmers to shift to water saving 
commercial crops in irrigated area.  
 
States 1990-1993   1997-2000   
Growth Rates (Per Cent 1997-2000 
over 1990-1993) 
  
Grain 
orientation 
(GOA) 
Grain orientation-
Irrigated 
(GOA-IR)  
Grain 
orientati
on 
(GOA) 
Grain 
orientation-
Irrigated 
(GOA-IR)  
Grain orientation 
(GOA) 
Grain orientation-
Irrigated 
(GOA-IR)  
Haryana 0.77 0.70  0.70 0.70  -9.22 -0.88  
Punjab 0.93 0.78  0.76 0.78  -17.77 -0.98  
Himachal Pradesh 0.87 0.63  0.86 0.85  -0.48 34.99  
Uttar Pradesh 0.88 0.81  0.84 0.77  -4.75 -4.96  
North Zone 0.88 0.79  0.81 0.76  -7.85 -3.07  
West Bengal 0.86 0.95  0.70 0.77  -18.36 -19.18  
Bihar- 0.92 0.89  0.95 0.92  3.46 2.60  
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Orissa 0.81 0.70  0.64 0.80  -20.26 13.90  
Assam 0.76 0.94  0.69 0.66  -8.97 -29.79  
East Zone 0.85 0.86  0.76 0.83  -10.50 -2.62  
Karnataka 0.58 0.52  0.62 0.55  7.25 6.07  
Kerala 0.22 0.55  0.13 0.46  -41.10 -15.83  
Tamil Nadu 0.55 0.66  0.56 0.62  1.74 -5.97  
Andhra Pradesh 0.54 0.74  0.55 0.71  0.93 -3.64  
South Zone 0.53 0.66  0.54 0.64  1.10 -3.31  
Gujarat 0.40 0.42  0.34 0.34  -14.68 -19.73  
Maharashtra 0.83 0.60  0.73 0.55  -11.92 -8.04  
MP 0.59 0.93  0.53 0.84  -11.32 -9.51  
Rajasthan 0.60 0.53  0.60 0.51  0.77 -3.65  
West Zone 0.63 0.64  0.58 0.59  -8.71 -7.88  
Total 0.70 0.74  0.65 0.71  -6.33 -4.76  
INDIA 0.68 0.71  0.65 0.71  -3.98 0.31  
Table 7: Grain orientation in India during 1990-1993 and 1997-2000 
Note GOA=GSA-fg/GSA 
GOA-IR=GIA-fg/GIA 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Government of India. 
 
 
DISTRIBUTION ASPECT 
 
Mismatch between allocation and off-take in the Public Distribution System (PDS): 
 
A problem in the PDS is the amount of leakages of food grains and other commodities in 
the form of losses in the transport and storage and diversion to the free market. According 
to some estimates a little more than a third of the food grains and sugar and over half of 
the edible oil (38% of wheat, 36% of rice, 39% of sugar and 55%of the edible oil) does 
not reach the actual users of PDS1.The major part of the leakage is due to the diversion of 
food grains to the free market. 
            Sometimes, shop owners make bogus entries in the ration cards. For example, in a 
village in ‘Dahanu Taluka’ in Maharashtra, the tribes have not tested sugar for over a 
year. But, one family’s ration card tells a different story.  According to an entry made for 
June 1995, this undernourished tribal bought 26 kgs of sugar on a single day2! The same 
is true of the other villages in Dahanu. The delivery systems in rural areas are generally 
very poor. Even if a fair price shop exists, food grains are not available in many places.    
             Recently, it has been observed that, Government has increased the procurement 
price, acting as support price (price-floor), for rice, dal and pulses. Probably, one possible 
reason was that: despite the short-term hike in food grain prices, there would be a long 
term benefit due to the fact that, the farmers would work hard to get higher return; so that 
production could rise. But along with this, Government has to raise the issue price of 
food grains through the PDS. Consequently, the price-differential between open market 
and PDS issue price has narrowed down. Here quality also plays an important role, so 
                                                 
1Ahluwalia, D. (1993) - “Public distribution in India; coverage, Targeting and Leakages”. Food 
Policy, vol.8, no.1.     
 
2Menezes (1995).  
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willingness to buy from PDS falls. It is basically a demand-driven reduction. As a result, 
PDS off-take has been declined in recent years, which implies rise in carrying cost and 
wastages. This, in turn, leads to loss in welfare and therefore leading to budgetary burden 
to the government. 
 
Table 8:                                                          
Year Wheat 
allocation 
Wheat off 
take 
Rice allocation Rice off take 
2003-04 15.8 10.8 20.8 13.4 
2004-05 16.8 13.1 24 16.6 
2005-06 14.8 12.2 26.7 19.2 
2006-07 9.2 10.4 26.3 21.2 
2007-08 11.1 10.9 26.3 22.6 
2008-09 22.7 12.6 32.8 22.2 
2009-10 23.4 11.4 22.5 16.8 
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Source: Economic Survey, 2010.     Figure: 3. 
       
 
 
Wholesale and retail prices 
 
It has been found that the gap between wholesale and retail prices is widening. It appears 
that there are forces that are allowing marketing margins- at both wholesale and retail 
levels- to increase. This means that the direct producers, the farmers do not get the 
benefit of rising price, which the consumers in both rural and urban areas are forced to 
pay.  
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Table 9 represents the prices increase in cities averaged across the major regions for rice 
and atta, which are among the most essential food grains in any households. It is evident 
that the price increase has been as rapid as to be alarming especially over the past two 
years, with rice prices increasing by nearly half in Northern cities and more than half in 
Southern cities. Atta prices have, on average, increased by around one-fifth from their 
level of two years ago. 
 
Table 9: Retail prices in major cities/towns, by zone. 
 
Average retail price 
on 27.01.10 
(in Rupees) 
Increase over 1 year 
(per cent) 
Increase over 2 years 
(per cent) 
Rice 
North Zone 19.92 11.94 48.45 
West Zone 19.33 9.78 29.37 
East Zone 16.19 10.31 16.30 
South Zone 22.25 32.84 58.93 
Atta 
North Zone 17.00 24.90 24.90 
West Zone 17.17 15.73 21.85 
East Zone 17.50 19.32 22.09 
South Zone 20.38 5.16 13.19 
Source: Ministry of Food and Civil Supplies, Food Price Monitoring 
System, 12 February 2010. 
 
Other food grains, like pulses, dal & vegetables, have also shown dramatic increase 
especially in the past year.  
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In rice, the gap between average wholesale and retail prices widened considerably - even 
doubled - across the four major zones of the country, as shown in Chart 1. If wholesale 
price rises, there are two possibilities: a) some part is absorbed by the retailers; b) total 
increase goes to the consumers. In case of rice, the retail margin increases over the years 
across the four major zones because of (b).      
         
 
Effect of oil and petroleum prices: 
 
Table 9: 
YEARS FOOD PRICE INDICES OIL PRICE INDICES 
1999 91.13 91.57 
2000 89.5 67.82 
2001 92.29 67.61 
2002 90.18 87.02 
2003 98.35 100.81 
2004 111.47 112.18 
2005 114.68 103.64 
2006 122.43 112 
2007 154.07 169.08 
2008 191.28 225.42 
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2009 151.54 149.95 
Source: Ministry of Petroleum 
             
There is a huge effect of oil price on the food price indices in both developed and 
developing nations with the bulk of the effect falling on the latter nations. In this chart, 
we portray the effect of oil price indices on the food price indices over the years for a 
developing country like India. 
 
The upshot of the given data set is that as oil price rises over the years, the transportation 
cost of food rises. So to recover these costs, the firms raise the prices of food. As a result 
food price increases as petroleum price rises. 
 
Using data from 1999 to 2009, we observe that our hypothesis is supported from the 
strong positive correlation coefficient (0.976) between food price indices and oil price 
indices. Due to this highly strong positive correlation coefficient, it was initially expected 
whether the data set has any autocorrelation (AR) problem. In order to examine this, a 
Durbin-Watson‘d’ test was conducted, the result of which is as follows: 
 
The‘d’-test result: 
 We find that our‘d’ value comes out to be 1.783317. 
 Value of dU for one explanatory variable = 1.324 at 5% level of significance. 
 Therefore 4-dU = 2.676. 
 So we find that dU<d<4-dU. 
 
            Here we have, HO: ρ=0 
 Against H1:ρ≠0 
 After testing this, the null hypothesis is accepted at 5% level of significance. 
Therefore there is no AR, positive or negative. 
Inference: 
 So we can infer that the strong positive correlation between oil price indices and 
food price indices is justified and is free from any sort of autocorrelation. 
 
 
 
DEMAND SIDE ASPECT 
 
1. Population growth rate, total net availability and food grain prices: 
 
With the burden of increasing population in India over the years, the excess demand 
for food grains also accelerates consequently. This is because, with the increase in 
population, total net availability has not been increased proportionately. By the 
simple market mechanism, this excess demand for food grains propels food grain 
prices. 
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To test the validity of this hypothesis, we take data from 1960 to 2009 and conduct a 
time-series econometric analysis. For this purpose, we first check the orders of 
integration of the variables by augmented Dicky-Fullar (ADF) test: 
 
Table 9: Unit Root Test of food grain prices (WPI), total net availability and 
population growth rate 
    
Variables Orders of Integration 
1. Food grain prices (in terms of 
WPI) 
2. Total net availability 
3. Population growth rate 
 
1 
 
1 
1 
   
Then, we check whether these three time-series variables are actually co-integrated by 
Engel-Granjer test and we find that the estimated residual series is stationary at 5% 
level of significance by ADF test. Lastly, we regress food grain prices (in terms of 
WPI) over our stipulated time period on population growth rate and total net 
availability. We find that: 
 
 Total net availability 
 
Population growth rate 
Food grain prices (in 
terms of WPI) 
                     -3.16E-10* 
                     [-1.965]** 
                     (0.056)*** 
                -348769.5* 
                 [-10.208]** 
                 (0.000)*** 
*estimated slope-coefficients 
**computed t-statistics 
***p-values 
The estimated slope coefficients are turned out to be negative, which supports our 
theory and since the computed t-statistics corresponding to the estimated slope 
coefficients are statistically significant (for total net availability, at 10% level of 
significance and for population growth rate, at 1% level of significance); our 
proposition gets adequate support. 
 
 
DIFFERENT POLICIES 
 
• Need and effect of these policies: 
 
Such policies were needed to reduce the unemployment in rural areas by creating gainful 
additional employment. Creation of additional employment is crucial in the sense that 
these additional employment generation transfers some amount of money to the people 
which increases people's purchasing power, which stimulates rural demand. Thus there is 
a sharp increase in demand for food grains (as for poor people food grain is of at most 
necessity). So, the government objective in generating employment is taken care of. But 
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it creates a burden on agricultural sector to produce more output and if agricultural output 
doesn't expand sufficiently then it results in increase in food prices. Here we'll consider 
two wage employment policies namely Jawahar Rozgar Yojana (JRY) and Employment 
Assurance Scheme (EAS), which came into presence from 1989 onward. 
 
• Jawahar Rozgar Yojana (JRY): 
 JRY is a poverty alleviation scheme, which falls under the category of programme 
for creation of supplementary employment opportunities. It was formed on April, 1, 
1989. It is a self targeting scheme and it offers a legitimate minimum wage for unskilled 
labours, which is generally lower than the prevailing market wage rates.  
 Based on the data collected by the field teams, it is observed that 35.9% of the 
total populations in all the selected Gram Panchayat were available for employment. Of 
these, 14.8 percent and 14.3 percent were actually employed during 1989-90 and 1990-
91, respectively. However, in the first half of 1991-92 (Up to September, 1991) only 3 
percent of those available for employment were employed.  
 
• Employment Assurance Scheme (EAS): 
 EAS was launched on 2nd October, 1993 in 1773 blocks of the country. The 
scheme was aimed at providing assured employment to all rural adults who are below 
poverty line and are seeking for employment but are unable to find it. The programme 
has been restructured on 1st Apr 1999. At present, the EAS is being implemented in 3198 
blocks of the country. 
 As per report received up to March, 1999, the employment generated is 4165.31 
lakh man days and 745.24 lakh man days during 2000-01. 
 It is clear that both JRY & EAS had provided an increase in the level of 
employment. But that increase was not as effective as the 2005 implemented project 
National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA). This project was taken on a 
large scale compared to the earlier projects such as JRY & EAS. So, we'll try to capture 
its effect on food grain prices. 
 
 
National Rural Employment Guarantee Act 
 
National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA) is a policy taken up by the 
government in 2005 to enhance the purchasing power of the poor rural people of India. 
             
It constructed a 100 day work scheme for the rural poor. This scheme generated a higher 
rural demand for the food grains. This resulted in an upward trend in food prices. 
 
In this analysis we have taken number of man days generated as a proxy for income 
generated (taking wages constant) as the explanatory variable. We have monthly data 
from April, 2008 to March, 2010. 
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Man Days(x) FPI Lagged FPI(y) 
23037.85 208.38 133.33 
28546.27 213.29 136.59 
28856.94 213.54 139.05 
28928.35 208.16 139.70 
28954.05 196.60 142.82 
28965.32 185.23 143.28 
28969.93 163.46 146.16 
28977.86 150.49 147.14 
28981.71 133.33 152.18 
29009.26 136.59 152.84 
29018.61 139.05 156.77 
29046.28 139.70 168.64 
39556.91 142.82 172.35 
40022.70 143.28 174.00 
40085.82 146.16 179.70 
40107.45 147.14 182.23 
40109.52 152.18  
40109.52 152.84  
40144.13 156.77  
40144.29 168.64  
40146.14 172.35  
40146.14 174.00  
40146.14 179.70  
40146.14 182.23  
Source: nrega.nic.in. 
 
As funds allocated by the government takes some time to reach the hands of the 
employees in NREGA through proper channels, food prices also begin to increase after 
that stipulated period as a result of increase in purchasing power of those people. So we 
have to take lag in food prices. Taking lags in food price indices (FPI) of different 
months, we have empirically observed that value of r2 is maximum (0.775) if we take 9 
month’s lag. So, our model is:    
                                           
                                          Yt = α + βXt-9 + €t 
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Dependent Variable: Y   
Method: Least Squares   
Sample (adjusted): 1  -  16   
Included observations: 16 after adjustments  
    
      Variable Coefficient  Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
      
      C 70.80257  12.18346 5.811366 0.0000 
X 0.002662  0.000384 6.935942 0.0000 
      
       R-squared 0.774584 Mean dependent var  154.1740
Adjusted R-squared 0.758482 S.D. dependent var  16.17942
S.E. of regression 7.951286 Akaike info criterion  7.101013
Sum squared resid 885.1214 Schwarz criterion  7.197587
Log likelihood -54.80810 Hannan-Quinn criter.  7.105958
F-statistic 48.10729 Durbin-Watson stat  1.081327
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000007      
       
     
 
Hence, by looking at the P-value for the slope coefficient, the chances of calculating a t-
value of 6.936 or more, when the true value is in fact zero, is 6.92E-06 = 6.92/106 = 
0.00000692 = 0.000692%. Since, this is such a small probability; we concluded that there 
is a very little chance that the true population slope coefficient is zero. Note that, 95% of 
all possible slope parameters lie between 0.00184 & 0.003485, which does not include 
zero, and so the slope coefficient is significantly different from zero at the (100% - 95%) 
= 5% level of significance.  
     
Test for autocorrelation: 
 
Now we test for the presence of autocorrelation in this model, i.e. we’ll examine whether 
the disturbance terms in the various years are correlated or not. 
 
We have calculated, 
                                    d = 1.387755971 
 
dU for 1 explanatory variable and for 16 observations is 1.371, at 5% level of significance.  
 
Since dU (=1.371) < d (=1.388) < 4-dU (= 2.629), so to test H0: ρ = 0, vs., H1: ρ ≠ 0, we 
accept H0 at 5% level of significance. So there is no presence of autocorrelation. 
 
Inference: 
              
            So, man days generated in NREGA program can significantly increase food grain 
prices by stimulating rural demand. 
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Conclusion 
 
In the conclusion of our study we see that the pre existing factors or the exogenous 
factors (such as public investment) were present in the preceding periods but the severity 
have increased and there are others new endogenous factors which were also present 
(such as NREGA). These two types of factors played a culminating role in increasing the 
food prices. Endogenous factors could also be termed as demand driven factors, which 
had an important role to increase the demand for essential food articles. 
Apart from these factors another important factor has been the impact of crude oil prices. 
As crude oil prices increased internationally the transportation cost increased, so the 
problem got more aggravated.  
Lack of policy implementation by the government also aggravated the situation. Public 
investment channelization became more important in this context. Especially when the 
farmers are switching from food grain production to cash crop production, there have to 
be some incentive given to the farmers so that farmers produce food grains. 
Public investment in irrigation facility is also very important in this context to increase 
the production levels (i.e. it will reduce the dependence of agricultural production to 
monsoon). 
As all these factors are interlinked, so we recommend a revamp in the government’s 
policy so that these problems could be mitigated. 
The government needs to play as a planned player to increase production such as in the 
recent budget recommendation of need for another Green Revolution. Though there is a 
lot of negativity associated with it, but still some policy measures have to be considered 
by the government so that the food security problem can be tackled in a proper way. 
 
 
 
Limitations 
 
 
In our analysis, we tried to incorporate the most probable variables but our study is not 
complete due to the following reasons: 
Lack of availability of long term data (specially on wholesale and retail prices when we 
tried to capture the effect of intermediaries, data of different parts specially of corruption 
and hoarding is not available, so knowing these economic facts impact on food prices, we 
cannot capture its exact effects. 
Due to the above problem, we cannot run a multiple regression model to capture all the 
effects simultaneously. 
But still we tried in these contexts to present the economic reasons, which could be 
responsible. Admitting these drawbacks we tried here to analyze the different factors 
effects on recent food price hike in the context of India. 
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Appendix: 
Table A.1: Population growth rate, Total net availability and Food price indices (in 
terms of WPI) for India from 1961-2009.  
YEAR Population growth rate 
Total net 
availability WPI of Food Grains 
1961 0.00 76048817000.00 4.43 
1962 0.001130068 76461197000.00 4.67 
1963 0.001150669 75351546000.00 5.10 
1964 0.001163584 78740489400.00 6.44 
1965 0.001170269 85427897200.00 6.83 
1966 0.00117196 74333716000.00 8.10 
1967 0.001169687 74818868500.00 10.11 
1968 0.001164572 88035310000.00 8.90 
1969 0.001157533 86948062500.00 9.22 
1970 0.001149386 90951210900.00 9.16 
1971 0.001139444 95861854800.00 9.47 
1972 0.001126758 97775978000.00 10.94 
1973 0.0011198 90219258000.00 12.99 
1974 0.001121358 98761202100.00 17.93 
1975 0.00112701 90791932000.00 15.94 
1976 0.001128787 97471249600.00 13.98 
1977 0.001127634 100686611200.00 15.60 
1978 0.001124106 112205522800.00 15.80 
1979 0.001117828 116864451900.00 16.98 
1980 0.001108337 103237266400.00 19.84 
1981 0.001095166 116668286000.00 21.74 
1982 0.001078047 119330558600.00 23.71 
1983 0.001056483 117084484000.00 25.95 
1984 0.001030431 131193475000.00 25.45 
1985 0.000999529 126631828500.00 27.06 
1986 0.001058388 136283949900.00 28.13 
1987 0.00103737 137372960000.00 30.71 
1988 0.001022096 133267406000.00 35.17 
1989 0.001002147 149939553500.00 35.95 
1990 0.000982977 146541337500.00 38.95 
1991 0.000964541 161347886000.00 47.04 
1992 0.00090504 151050673100.00 52.69 
1993 0.000899403 152346332600.00 56.69 
1994 0.000874834 157499884000.00 65.02 
1995 0.000864562 168538144000.00 69.44 
1996 0.000853574 164609686500.00 78.00 
1997 0.000842581 177252580800.00 78.97 
1998 0.000831643 160292102400.00 86.17 
1999 0.000820765 169832720000.00 100.00 
2000 0.000813512 168554400000.00 98.24 
2001 0.000753422 156760800000.00 101.32 
2002 0.000787225 189239600000.00 99.01 
2003 0.000683549 169920800000.00 107.90 
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2004 0.000718087 182412000000.00 122.39 
2005 0.000663133 168849000000.00 125.91 
2006 0.000653677 180375000000.00 134.36 
2007 0.000644482 180450000000.00 169.15 
2008 0.000635536 181488000000.00 209.99 
2009 0.000626829 1.87226E+11 215.00 
 
 
Source: Planning Commission of India. 
 
